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Mr. Fordham stands by his legal analysis, and its application to the
instant dispute, that is set forth in his Opening Brief. He seeks to refrain from
unnecessarily repeating the arguments, regarding the correctness of which he
remains confident, that appear in that Brief.
I.

MR. OLDROYD HAS FAILED SATISFACTORILY TO COUNTER
IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF MR. FORDHAM'S ARGUMENT.

Mr. Oldroyd has failed satisfactorily to counter important aspects of the
argument set forth in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief, including the following: the
proposition that application of the professional rescuer doctrine runs afoul of
the Utah statutory scheme; the proposition that application of the doctrine runs
afoul of the fundamental principle of Utah tort law that each person whose
negligence proximately contributes to an injury should bear his proportionate
share of fault for his conduct and pay his proportionate share of damages
caused by his conduct; the proposition that application of the doctrine unfairly
discriminates against Utah public safety officers; the proposition that the
original basis of the doctrine is not applicable to the facts of this case;
(implicitly) by acknowledging (at p. 10 of his Brief) that the doctrine does not
work to bar Mr. Fordham's claim against the driver whose vehicle struck him,1

1

As explained in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief at 20-22, the supposed
philosophical underpinnings of the professional rescuer doctrine - including
the notion that public safety officers are paid to encounter risks in the course of
their employment - should, if consistently applied, prevent public safety

the proposition that the doctrine is logically and legally inconsistent; and the
proposition that the Court of Appeals' "duty" and "causation" analyses are
flawed.
The Court may fairly infer that Mr. Oldroyd's failure satisfactorily to
respond to these contentions is not as a result of lack of thoroughness on his
counsel's part but based on the weakness of the arguments that can be made
against them.
II.

MR. OLDROYD INCORRECTLY IMPLIES THAT THE
PROFESSIONAL RESCUER DOCTRINE APPLIES ONLY TO
CLAIMS OF PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS WHO RESPOND TO
REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE BY PEOPLE SUCH AS
MR. OLDROYD.

Near the end of his Brief, at 11, Mr. Oldroyd contends:
The [professional rescuer doctrine] recognizes that citizens should be
free to summon help from professional rescuers without concern that
they might later be sued by the public safety officer if he or she happens
to be injured while confronting a hazard in the course and scope of his
or her employment. To hold otherwise could constitute a [deterrent] to
citizens summoning help when in need and would essentially create a
double recovery for public safety officers injured in the course of their
employment while receiving compensation for doing their jobs.2

officers from pursuing claims against anyone whose negligence causes them
to be injured - not only those whose antecedent negligence causes them to
be at a given scene, but also those whose negligence injures them while they
are at the scene.
2

For reasons explained in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief, at 15, the reference
to "double recovery" in the final sentence of this excerpt from Mr. Oldroyd's
Brief should be given no significant consideration. For a basic rule of Utah law
(see Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-106) is that people injured while doing their jobs
2

The fact of the matter is that the doctrine, in its broadest application,
recognized by the Court of Appeals and urged by Mr. Oldroyd, would work to
prevent Mr. Fordham from recovering against Mr. Oldroyd regardless of
whether Mr. Oldroyd himself made a "911" call or otherwise summoned aid.
According to the Court of Appeals and Mr. Oldroyd's overall position, the
doctrine would prevent Mr. Fordham from recovering damages from
Mr. Oldroyd regardless of whether someone else reported Mr. Oldroyd's own
rollover incident and regardless of whether Mr. Fordham had just happened
upon the scene.3
It is also worthy of note that the doctrine would not prohibit claims of, for
example (this is but one example of the discriminatory nature of the Rule),
ambulance personnel and paramedics responding to accident scenes caused
by the negligence of people such as Mr. Oldroyd if such emergency
responders should happen to be struck by vehicles such as the vehicle driven
by the person that struck Mr. Fordham.

have the statutory right, even though they receive workers compensation
benefits, which do precious little to compensate severely injured people like
Mr. Fordham, to pursue claims against those whose negligence has caused
them to sustain damages.
3

Indeed, in this case, it was someone else (an occupant of a vehicle that was
already at the scene), and not Mr. Oldroyd, who made the "911" call. R. 6263.
3

III.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT BE PERSUADED BY THE FACT
THAT THE MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE
CONSIDERED THE ISSUE HEW TO THE PROFESSIONAL
RESCUER DOCTRINE, GENERALLY OR AS APPLIED TO THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE.

Mr. Oldroyd relies heavily on the proposition that the majority of
jurisdictions that have considered the issue still cling to the professional
rescuer doctrine. This Court is, of course, not bound by the case law of other
jurisdictions. This Court should look at such things as relevant policy
considerations; the discriminatory nature of the doctrine; its lack of logical
consistency; the fact that basic principles of established Utah tort common and
statutory law are not necessarily parts of the law of the states that have
adopted and still apply the doctrine; and the possibility that the Court may be
more tuned into basic concepts of fairness than are the courts of some other
jurisdictions. Applying the doctrine to Mr. Fordham's claim simply on the basis
of a "head count" of decisions from around the country is not intellectually or
legally satisfying.
IV.

OTHER JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN ADDITION TO
THOSE CITED AND DISCUSSED IN MR. FORDHAM'S
OPENING BRIEF, AS WELL AS COGENT ANALYSES BY
OTHER COMMENTATORS, SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION
THAT THE PROFESSIONAL RESCUER DOCTRINE,
GENERALLY OR AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE,
SHOULD NOT WORK TO PREVENT MR. FORDHAM FROM
PRESENTING HIS CASE AGAINST MR. OLDROYD TO A
JURY.

4

In Wills v. Bath Excavating & Constr. Co., 829 P.2d 405,409 (Colo. App.
1991), the Colorado Court of Appeals explained:
We agree with the Banvai [799 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1990), a case
discussed in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief at 18] analysis that, while a
public safety officer's special skills, training, and experience may be
considered with reference to any comparative negligence involved, a per
se grant of immunity to those whose negligence created a dangerous
situation for the officer is unwarranted. In consequence, we conclude
that the fireman's rule is no longer the law in Colorado.
The doctrine of assumption of risk is the law in Colorado and poses a
question for the trier of fact. And, while not a complete bar to recovery,
the assumption of risk is to be considered by the trier of fact in
apportioning negligence. [Citation omitted.] Further because
assumption of risk is a question for the trier of fact, it may not be
decided on summary judgment. [Citation omitted.]
Finally, we are not unmindful of the worthwhile public policy
considerations which have given rise to the fireman's rule. We are also
aware of the widespread, albeit often restricted, adoption of the principle
in other jurisdictions. However we leave to the General Assembly any
assignment of legal acceptance of the negligence of others to firemen,
policemen, or any other public safety officers.
The judgment [in favor of entities similarly situated to Mr. Oldroyd] is
reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial.
In Court v. Grzelinski. 379 N.E.2d 281,285 (III. 1978), the Illinois
Supreme Court held:
... to the extent a fireman is a person to whom injury from [a] product
may reasonably be foreseen, he may recover in products liability, even
though his injury was incurred while fighting a fire in the course of his
employment. In so holding, we reject the opportunity to extend the
"fireman's rule" beyond its limited context of landowner/occupier liability.

5

Also, in an insightful dissent, in Walters v. Sloan, 571 P.2d 609, 20
Cal.3d 199, 212-13 (Cal. 1977), Acting Chief Justice Tobriner wrote:
Proponents of the fireman's rule argue most frequently that it is the
fireman's job to extinguish fires and the policeman's job to make arrests.
They conclude that a fireman or policeman can base no tort claim upon
damage caused by the very risk that he is paid to encounter and with
which he is trained to cope. The argument, in essence, is that the
fireman or policeman, in accepting the salary and fringe benefits offered
for his job, assumes all normal risks inherent in his employment as a
matter of law, and thus may not recover from one who negligently
creates such a risk. [Citations omitted.]
The fallacy in this argument is simply that it proves too much. Under
this analysis an employee would routinely be barred from bringing a tort
action whenever an injury he suffers at the hands of a negligent
tortfeasor could be characterized as a normal inherent risk of his
employment. Yet, as noted above, past California cases have regularly
permitted highway workers - whose jobs obviously subject them to the
"inherent risk" of being injured by a negligent driver - to recover for
damages inflicted by such third party negligence [citation omitted] and
have permitted construction workers - whose employment poses
numerous risks of injury at the hands of another - to recover tort
damages for work-related injuries so long as the negligent tortfeasor is
not their employer. [Citation omitted.]
As these and countless other cases demonstrate, while policemen and
firemen regularly face substantial hazards in the course of their
employment and are, theoretically at least, compensated for such risks,
a host of other employees - highway repairmen, highrise construction
workers, utility repairmen and the like - frequently encounter
comparable risks in performing their jobs and, again theoretically, also
receive compensation for such risks. California decisions have never
perceived such theoretical compensation as a sufficient basis for barring
the employee's cause of action against a negligent tortfeasor.

6

The author of Case Note. Wauqonei v

loutmctn Oil Company -

Arkansas Adopts the Fireman's Rule: Do Volunteer Firefighters Get Burned
•v ^°

374-75(1997), wrote:

LJ> denying a public safety officer recovery from a negligent tortfeasor
the officer is not directed to recover his damages from the general
public; rather the officer is totally precluded from recovering these
damages from anyone. Contrast this with other public employees who
are injured when confronting dangers on their jobs. The latter can
recover workers' compensation and salary benefits from the public, but
are also allowed additional tort damages from the third-party tortfeasors.
Under the "fireman's rule" the injured public safety officer must bear a
loss which other public employees are not required to bear.
The author of Note: Egual Protection and the Fireman's Rule in Ohio.
,23, 144 (1988), wrote:
The common law governing the suits of firemen and policemen against
tortfeasors for personal injury damages is in need of a complete
restructuring. The most traditional fireman's rule bars firemen from
recovery for injuries directly resulting from a fire and categorize them as
licensees in their suits against landowners for injury resulting from the
negligent maintenance of their property. The Ohio courts have not
modernized, or indeed even altered to any extent, this rule since its
creation, and the landowner's duty system upon which it is based is
outdated.
The determination of whether firemen and policemen can recover for
their injuries should depend instead, upon the presence of fault, the
basis of all tort law. In short, the property owner should be liable to the
[fireman] for his injuries directly resulting from the fire when the
landowner negligently or intentionally caused the fire. The fireman
should be owed that same duty of care owed to rescuers and public and
private employees - a general duty of care owed to all foreseeably
injured.

7

This restructuring would remedy the inequitable treatment suffered by
firemen and policemen, and at the same time, would further two
important public policies. Allowing recovery by firemen would serve to
deter negligence in causing fires and would encourage persons to enter
this important area of public service which asks man every day to put
another's safety and welfare before his own.
See, also. The Missouri "Fireman's Rule": An Unprincipled Rule in Search of a
Theory. 58 UMKC L. Rev. 329 (1990).
V.

MR. OLDROYD HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY RESPONDED TO
MR. FORDHAM'S CONTENTION THAT PARTS OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION (DEALING WITH DUTY AND
CAUSATION) NEED TO BE CORRECTED.

At page 13 of its decision, the Court of Appeals states:
... we believe that application of the [professional rescuer doctrine] is
consistent with the existing tort law of this state.
It is apparently because Mr. Fordham contended, in the Court of
Appeals proceedings - as he is here contending -- that adoption of the
professional rescuer doctrine would go against the grain of general principles
of Utah statutory and common law that the Court of Appeals felt constrained to
make the quoted observation and then, at paragraphs 21-27, and n. 3, attempt
to show just how such supposed consistency exists. As Mr. Fordham has,
however, shown, at pp. 24-26 of his Opening Brief, the Court of Appeals'
discussion of "The Element of Duty" (paragraphs 21-22) and "The Element of
Causation" (paragraphs 23-27 and n. 3) is sorely flawed. And Mr. Oldroyd's

8
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In the Conclusion (p. 13^
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly determined that the professional
rescuer doctrine is based upon sound public policy principles.
Application of the professional rescuer doctrine to the facts of this case
negate[s] any duty owed by Defendant-Appellant to Plaintiff Appellant
Fordham....
It is fundamental Utah common law that a person who n<"Is finr.liiilinu
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erating his motor vehicle in a negligent fashion) owes a duty of
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vehicle collision are, indeed, among the most foreseeably injured classes of
persons who may be injured in response to such incidents. And Mr. Oldroyd
has in his deposition testimony (see Facts numbered 7-14 set forth at pp. 7-8
of Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief) acknowledged that proposition to be true in
the circumstances of this very case.
It is simply unfair for public safety officers to be singled out for such
discriminatory treatment. If Mr. Fordham had not been an on-duty public
safety officer but had been off-duty, or an ambulance worker, or a "Good
Samaritan" member of the public, the professional rescuer doctrine would not
prevent him from pursuing a claim against Ms. Oldroyd.. Private sector
employees and other public employees, such as sanitation department
workers, water department workers, Department of Transportation
maintenance crewmembers, and U.S. Postal Service letter carriers, are not
prohibited by the doctrine from pursuing claims against those whose
antecedent negligence causes them to be injured while they are responding to
incidents. Nor are judges or court clerks. But courthouse security officers
probably are.
Why, in fairness, should public safety officers (whose job duties do not
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Ai id there is, contrary to the Court of Appeals

It should be kept in mind that Mr. Fordham himself was not, strictly speaking,
involved in any "rescue" efforts at the time he was injured.
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decision and Mr. Oldroyd's contentions, no truly good reason - especially in
the face of all the contrary considerations suggested hereinabove and in
Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief - for this Court to adopt the doctrine as part of
the common law of Utah.
Nearly all of the cases discussed by Mr. Oldroyd deal, in one form or
another, with the concept of assumption of risk. The Court of Appeals
recognized, at fl 16 of its decision, that"... adoption of the professional-rescuer
doctrine in Utah cannot be supported by a rationale based upon a theory of
assumption of risk." The Court of Appeals then appears to have founded its
decision substantially on the public policy principle announced in Berko v.
Freda, 459 A.2d 663, 666 (N.J. 1983):
Governmental entities maintain police and fire departments in
anticipation of those inevitable physical perils that burden the human
condition, whereas most public employment posts are created not to
confront dangers that will arise but to perform some other public function
that may incidentally involve risk....

This fundamental concept rests on the assumption that
governmental entities employ firefighters and police officers, at least in
part, to deal with the hazards that may result from their taxpayers' own
future acts of negligence.... Exposing the negligent taxpayer to liability
for having summoned the police would impose upon him multiple
burdens for that protection.
The crux of this view is that, because public safety officers are hired to
confront dangers, whereas other classes of public employees perform
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dissent include fhp following:
The majority attempts to distinguish police officers and fire fighters
who are paid to "confront danger" from other kinds of public employees
on the ground that the latter are merely paid "to perform some other
public function[s] that may incidentally involve risk."... This asserted
distinction merely disguises the fact there are more similarities than
differences between police officers and fire fighters and a host of other
public employees. Police officers on traffic patrol may be exposed to
risks entirely comparable to highway workers doing road work. Many
5

Another troubling aspect of the doctrine is that it appears to bar claims of onduty public safety officers who go "beyond the call of duty" - whatever that
means ~ and perform truly heroic acts that might arguably be considered to be
"voluntary" in nature, i.e., beyond what the duties for which they are paid fairly
require.
13

public employees - police officer and sanitation worker alike - confront
dangers on the job. Conversely, both classes of employees also
confront "ordinary" risks not involving usual danger. Because law
enforcement in some instances entails greater risks, police officers
should not be deemed to have forsaken the right to seek compensation
for injury resulting from such risks - unless, as the majority seems to
believe, the monetary compensation that police officers receive is
commensurate with the extraordinary risks of their jobs. ... But, no
empirical or rhetorical support is marshaled to bolster this assumption.
And even if police officers and fire fighters are presumed to be
adequately compensated for the risks of their work, the majority does
not explain why other governmental employees, who must also be
presumed to receive adequate compensation for their work, should not
therefore be prohibited, as are police officers and fire fighters, from
recovering from negligent third parties for injuries attributable to the risks
normally inherent in their employment.

The majority also claims that its holding is in accord with
"fundamental concepts of justice" that call for the "prohibit[ion of] a
police officer from complaining of negligence in the creation of the very
occasion for his engagement."... It explains "that governmental entities
employ firefighters and police officers, at least in part, to deal with the
hazards that may result from their taxpayers' own future acts of
negligence," and further, that "[ejxposing the negligent taxpayer to
liability for having summoned the police would impose upon him multiple
burdens for that protection." ...
This is, in my consideration, a weak frame upon which to drape
the heavy weight of a public policy argument. The contention that
taxpayers will be forced to bear multiple burdens for police and fire
protection incorrectly assumes that the police officer or fire fighter has
already been compensated adequately for the injury received in the line
of duty. Additionally, the argument inaccurately characterizes the
particular tortfeasor as a "taxpayer" of the municipality or governmental
entity that employs the police officer or fire fighter. Any citizen, any
member of the public, regardless of whether he or she pays taxes to the
municipality, is entitled to the police and fire protection offered by
government; that entitlement does not rest upon the payment of taxes in

14

support of government. Further, the "notion" that a taxpayer is the
employer of the police officer or fire fighter is ill-conceived. ... If this
characterization were sound, the defense of workers' compensation
would presumably bar any public employee's right to recover from a
negligent taxpayer whose tortious conduct caused injuries received by
the public employee arising out of his or her employment. And, on this
premise, this bar would apply to all injuries received directly in ll n I
if
duty including those attributable to so-called "independent cau; i
in
short, there would be no need for a "fireman's rule."

. once officers and fire fighters should not be placed beyond the
< ° iiHicial philosophy that searches for just and fair results.
note that Justice Handler r

•• •

another vigorous dissent, in Rosa v. Dunkin' Donuts. 583 A.2c . ._~,
1ii':Mii i I I I I I 111 mi course nl vvhiili he WMJIC, al 1 HO:
I strongly believe we should abrogate the fireman's rule. The rule, as
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common-law immunities. ... I do not see how the beneficent purposes
of the law would be undermined if claims based on such ordinary workrelated negligence were to be addressed and resolved by the
application of generally-understood and accepted tort principles.
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rejection of the professional rescuer doctrine ~ that is sound and good. That
would not help Mr. Fordham, a decent and honorable man who was severely
injured while trying to protect people from harm.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As has been articulated in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief and in the
foregoing analysis and examples of case law and commentary treatment of the
issue, this Court should rule that no part of the professional rescuer doctrine is
or should be part of the common law of the State of Utah. There are
compelling reasons to so rule and no truly satisfactory reason to rule
otherwise.
This Court has historically vigilantly protected the rights of classes of
Utahns to be treated fairly and nondiscriminatorily. It has many times been
called upon to scrutinize legislative enactments to see whether they pass Utah
and federal constitutional muster. This Court is also sometimes faced with its
own common law precedents' standing in the way of fair, modern, and
nondiscriminatory rules of law. There is here no such statute to consider, and
there is here no troubling precedent to consider overturning. This Court is free
to announce, and should announce, a rule of law that is based on fairness and
is consistent with general Utah statutory and common law and that
categorically rejects the professional rescuer doctrine.
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puipose of the doctrine - to insulate from liability landowner
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negligence causes firefighters to an iv
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Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief and in this

>
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doctrine to such circumstances only (circumstances that are not p

«

case).
This Cnurl shouU, in .iny ' ' v ^ i l , ml< Hull IL |iihlrvii«tii,il iesi.:iw-?i
doctrine does not preclude Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claims against
Mr. Oldroyd and should, accordingly, reverse the Court of Appeals' affirmance
*.

I he C u - i : of Appeals did not correctly adopt the professii >nnl rest i n 'i
doctrine, and it did not correctly delineate the rationales supporting it and its
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